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Abstract 
We investigate the decisions of listed firms to go private once again. We start by revealing 
that while a significant number of firms which go public is VC-backed, an overproportional 
share of these VC-backed firms go private later on (they stay on the exchange for an 
average of 8.5 years). We interpret this very robust pattern such that IPOs of VC-backed 
firms are to a large extent a temporary rather than a permanent feature of the corporate 
governance of these firms. We investigate various potential hypotheses why VCs actually 
seem to be able to bring marginal firms to the exchange by relating the going-private 
decisions to various characteristics of the IPO market as well as to VC characteristics. We 
find strong support for the certification ability of VCs: more experienced and reputable VCs 
are more able to bring marginal firms to public exchanges via an IPOs. These marginal firms 
backed-by more reputable and experienced VCs are more likely to go private later on. 
Hence, our analysis suggests that IPOs backed by experienced VCs are most likely to be a 
temporary rather than the final stage in the life of the portfolio firm. We find no support that 
reputable VCs underprice their IPO-exits more implying that they have no need to leave 
more money on the table to take the marginal firms public. 
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In the last decade we observed a very pronounced reduction of the number of ﬁrms listed on
public exchanges of which a signiﬁcant part is due to the going-private decisions of ﬁrms.
In the US the number decreased by 40 percent (see Figure 1) in the 1999-2010 period.
This process resembles a similar one in the 1980s which was followed by a subsequent
going-public wave. An obvious and important issue is to investigate the driving forces of
this going-private process. Rather, than addressing this issue in general (as in Mehran
and Perstiani (2010) and Bharath and Dittmar (2010)) we address a speciﬁc, but in our
view important aspect. By combing data on the going private process with data on VC-
backed IPOs we reveal that ﬁrms which have been backed by VCs at the time of their
IPO are overproportionally more likely to leave to go private later on again. VC-backed
IPOs are much more of a temporary nature as compared to ﬁrms which have not been
VC-backed. In our data sample of US IPOs covering the 1975-2010 period, 79.9 percent of
all ﬁrms which had initial VC-backing went private in the ﬁrst ten years after their IPO
as compared to 37.2 percent of all non-VC-backed IPOs. For the ﬁve period the number
are obviously smaller but with of similar relative size (52.2 percent as compared to 17.4
percent). We show in a ﬁrst step, that this pattern survives when we control for ﬁrm as
well as market characteristics (such as hot-issue markets).
From this observation and the fact that initial conditions at the time of the IPO have
predictive power for the going-private decision (i.e. the observation that marginal ﬁrms
which just made it to the exchange are more likely to leave the exchange later on via a
going-private decision) we derive our main research questions. First, why are VCs more
able and willing to bring marginal ﬁrms to the exchange. Second, do VCs compensate
shareholders for buying shares of these ﬁrms, e.g. via underpricing?
In order to answer the ﬁrst question we explore three potential hypotheses, namely that
VCs are especially able to time the market and bring marginal ﬁrms to the exchange.
Furthermore, we investigate the possibility that VCs have an incentive to grandstand, i.e.
young VC ﬁrms having an incentive to exit their portfolio ﬁrms to an overproportional
degree via an IPO to signal their quality and ability to select and nurture promising ﬁrms.
Finally, we explore the certiﬁcation hypothesis implying that especially experienced and
reputable VCs can use their characteristics to bring their marginal ﬁrms to the exchange.
Testing these hypotheses with our data set which covers a large part of all US IPOs
in the time period between 1975 and 2010 reveals that we do not ﬁnd support neither
for the timing nor for the grandstanding hypothesis. Our analysis, however, indicates
that measures for VC experience and reputation (derived partially from a recent study of
Nahata (2008) on the link between VC reputation and performance in the pre-IPO period)
of the VC which brought the ﬁrm initial to the exchange have a positive and signiﬁcant
impact on the going-private probability. This ﬁnding clearly supports our certiﬁcation
hypothesis implying that indeed more experienced and reputable VCs are able and willing
1to bring marginal ﬁrms to the market. This implies, that for those ﬁrms, the IPO is just a
temporary step in their life-time which is reverted rather soon and which is brought about
by the potential of the lead VC to overcome informational asymmetries in a better way
as compared to ﬁrms which have been going public with less experienced VCs or those
ﬁrms which went public on their own.
Our paper is closely related to two branches on the literature. On the one hand it con-
tributes to the literature on the going-private process and indirectly also on the going-
public decision. A number of recent papers have addressed in detail the going-private de-
cision (see in particular Bharath and Dittmar (2010) and Mehran and Perstiani (2010)).
None of these paper has, however, investigated the role of VCs and VC-backing in the
going-private process. There is also a large literature on the determinants of the choice
between being public or private, theoretical (see e.g. Zingales (1995)) as well as empirical
(see e.g. for a discussion Ritter and Welch (2002) and for a recent contribution T., He, and
Nandy (2010)). Thereby, the role of venture-backing in determining the optimal corporate
governance scheme (i.e. being a public or private company) has not played an important
role. With this back we aim to address this issue in detail and link the role of VCs in the
going public decision with the going-private process.
Furthermore, our paper is closely related to the literature on the exit choice of VCs. The
choice of VC exit via an IPO has played a decisive role in this literature. Starting with
Black and Gilson (1998) a substantial number of papers have addressed the choice of
exit mode of the VC via acquisitions or IPOs (see e.g. Giot and Schwienbacher (2007)
and Bayar and Chemmanur (2011)) as well as the issue of exit timing (see e.g. Giot
and Schwienbacher (2007) and Neus and Walz (2005)). In addition, the literature on
VC exit decisions (via IPOs) has looked into the implications of this decisive decision
on the contractual relationship between VC and entrepreneur (see e.g. Cumming (2008)
and Cumming and Johan (2008)). But most of these paper address the time at the IPO
or prior to the IPO. The only exception to this are papers investigating the post-IPO
ﬁnancial performance of VC-backed ﬁrms (see e.g. Brav and Gompers (1997)). However,
the dynamics of the corporate governance of VC-backed ﬁrms in the aftermath of the
IPO has not yet analyzed. By looking into the dynamics of the ﬁrm’s governance after the
VC-backed IPO (with the speciﬁc focus on the going-private decision) we aim to bring the
literature on VC exits and the literature on the ﬁrm’s decision to be a public or private
company together.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss some aggregate data
thereby trying to shed some light on the overall patterns our paper relies on. In the third
section we introduce our data set and provide some descriptive statistics on the going-
private decision. The fourth section concentrates on the going-private decision. The main
aim of this section is to show that our pattern that VC-backed ﬁrms are much more
likely to go private some years after their IPO survives if we control for ﬁrm and market
characteristics in a Cox proportional hazard model. The ﬁfth section is devoted to deriving
2some hypotheses which may explain the ability and willing of VCs to bring marginal
ﬁrms to the exchange. In the sixth session we test these hypotheses as well as investigate
whether VCs are underpricing their issues systematically. The seventh section contains
an extension and a robustness check of our basic analysis. The last session concludes.
2 Some aggregate data
In order to get a ﬁrst impression on the dynamics of the going-public and going-private
process we provide some aggregate data which we consider rather revealing.
Figure 1 clearly reveals the ﬂuctuations in the going public process. Whereas the IPO
market was booming in the 1990s, the number of IPOs were signiﬁcantly reduced in the
post 2000 decade. In the 1980s we observe strong ﬂuctuations in the yearly IPO ﬁgures.
These ﬂuctuations are even more pronounced if we consider the gross proceeds resulting
from these IPOs. Given the large number of IPOs we would expect an ever increasing
number of listed ﬁrms in the US.
Insert Figure 1 here
Looking into the data, however, reveals that this conjecture does not hold true. Rather,
beginning in 1999, we observe a very signiﬁcant drop in the number of listed companies
(see ﬁgure 2). The number of listed companies almost halved in the years after 1999.
Starting from almost 9,000 ﬁrms which were listed in the 1999, this number decreased to
little more than 5,000 ﬁrms in 2010. Theoretically this could be due to the fact that a
number of IPOs were not ﬁnancially viable and were forced by bankruptcy to leave the
exchanges. While there are companies which went bust, this is only part of the story at
most. Rather we observe a pronounced going-private process throughout the entire time
span (see ﬁgure 3). Delisting took place at a very signiﬁcant pace in the 1998-2010 period.
But even in calmer respective periods, signiﬁcant number of IPOs and delistings occurred.
Even in the 1990s with its very active IPO market, a minimum of 20 ﬁrms went private
with a maximum of more than 140 ﬁrms deciding to go private once again in 1990. In the
2000s the number of going-private cases was persistently high, often exceeding 100 ﬁrms
which went private per year and never falling below 60 ﬁrms per year.
Insert Figures 2 and 3 here
In both, the going-public as well as the going-private process, venture-backed companies
play a crucial role. Figure 1 provides a ﬁrst indication of the role of VC-backed companies
in the going public process. The ﬁgure reveals that throughout the entire span of our
observation period the share of VC-backed IPO never went below 20 percent (from the
31980s ongoing), reaching in a number of years even more than 60 percent of all IPOs. This
just reﬂects the fact that IPOs are a decisive exit channel for VC investments (see Black
and Gilson (1998) and Jeng and Wells (2000)) on this. VCs as intermediaries standing
in-between their investors and the portfolio ﬁrms are in very many cases designed as
closed-end funds implying that they have to disinvest their ventures after a quite limited
number of years (typically, the closed-end funds last for 10-12 years, see e.g. Gompers and
Lerner (2004))). Thereby, they have two major alternatives at hand to sell their shares in
their successful portfolio ﬁrms: either to sell the entire ﬁrm to another ﬁrm in the course
of a trade sale or to opt for an initial public oﬀering and to divest in the course of the
going-public process (see e.g. Nahata (2008)). Our numbers suggest that especially in the
1990s disinvestment via the IPO route was rather dominant, while it lost momentum in
the post 2000-period (see e.g. Kyriakos and Ueda (2007)) in line with the low dynamics
of the IPO market in general (see ﬁgure 1).
The number depicted in Figure 3 clearly reveal that VC-backed ﬁrms are overproportion-
ally likely to go private again. While throughout our entire time period 45 percent of all
ﬁrms who go public are venture backed of those ﬁrms which go private later on, more
than 80 percent have been initially been backed by a venture capitalist. This overpropor-
tional share of ﬁrms backed by VCs at the time of the IPO which go private later on is
at the center of our paper. We aim to investigate this matter in much more detail and
aim to discover whether it survives a more scrutinized investigation. These ﬁrst rough
and aggregate numbers, namely, only suggest rather than show that the fact that a ﬁrm
at the time of the IPO is VC-backed is determining their likelihood to go private again in
a positive manner. In order to get a more accurate picture and to avoid that some other
common characteristic of VC-backed ﬁrms (e.g. their age at time of the IPO) is driving
the later going-private decision we have to investigate the data in more detail and control
for other factors potentially inﬂuencing the going-private decision.
We pursue our analysis in two mayor steps. In the ﬁrst step, we investigate the deter-
minants of the going-private decision and ask whether, after controlling for many other
factors, it remains still the case that the fact that a ﬁrm was VC-backed at the time
of the IPO makes it signiﬁcantly more likely that this ﬁrm will go private once again.
Our answer to this question will be aﬃrmative: venture capitalists seem to be able to
bring ”marginal” ﬁrms (i.e. those with characteristics which just make them suitable for
the going-public process) on the stock exchange. On this basis of this aﬃrmative answer,
we turn to our second step, which is very much the main focus of the paper. There, we
investigate, potential reasons why venture capitalists are able and willing to bring these
marginal ﬁrms public. This analysis is founded on a number of hypotheses derived from
the venture capital and the going-public literature.
43 The data set
3.1 Data sources
The key innovation of our data set is the fact that we have merged IPO data and in-
formation on going-private decisions with data on VC-backed IPOs as well as data on
underlying VC characteristics. Thereby, we use the Center for Research on Security Prices
(CRSP) data base as source for the going-private decisions. With respect to the going-
private decision we code the following CRSP deletion codes as going-private: ”mergers”
(corresponding codes: 200 - 300) and ”dropped” (corresponding codes: 500 - 600). All
information on market prices are also from CRSP data base. We complement the infor-
mation on the going-private decision of CRSP with the Compustat information on the
going-private process (i.e. whenever we obtain missing information from the CRSP data
base while having information from Compustat on a going-private case we complement
our data set with the latter). The corresponding reasons for deletion in Compustat are:
acquisition or merger, reverse acquisition, leveraged buyout as well as ”now a private
company”. Furthermore, we extract the ﬁrm data on balance sheet information from this
data base as well. The information on VC characteristics stem from SDC Platinum, in
particular from Thomson’s Venture Expert data base. Information on IPOs (date of IPO
plus IPO price) are derived from all three data bases. Furthermore, we use data on ﬁrm
age at the time of the IPO which are provided by Jay Ritter on his website. Our data set
covers US IPOs and going private case from 1975 onwards.
3.2 Variable Descriptions
We look into two sets of variables which might potentially have an eﬀect on the going-
private decision: ﬁrm (and market) characteristics at the time of the IPO and variables
which reveal changes in ﬁrm characteristics during the time ﬁrms have been public.
Table 1 provides an overview on the main variables of our data set.
Insert Table 1 about here
3.3 Descriptive statistics
In the ﬁrst step of our detailed empirical analysis, we investigate the determinants of
the going-private decision of the ﬁrms in our data set, in particular of ﬁrms which have
had VC-backing at the time of the IPO. As a ﬁrst insight, we present some descriptive
statistics before turning to a more detailed multivariate analysis in the next section.
5We split the descriptive analysis in two steps. In the ﬁrst one, we provide a comparison of
going-private sample with the control group. This allows us to gain some ﬁrst insights into
the determinants of the going-private process. In the second step, we distinguish ﬁrm and
industry variables for VC-backed and non-VC-backed ﬁrms. This distinction allows us to
shed light on a potential selection bias of VC-backed ﬁrms, a bias we need to control for
in our multivariate variable to ensure that it is indeed the fact that ﬁrms are VC backed
which increase the likelihood that they go private eventually rather than simply reﬂecting
a selection bias. The multivariate analysis expands the descriptive analysis.
3.3.1 Going-private versus staying-public sample
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the comparison between the going-private
sample and the control group. It reveals that a number of ﬁrm characteristics at the time
of the IPO signiﬁcantly diﬀer between the going-private sample and the control group.
We report means as well as medians of the two samples. For both cases we conduct
mean-comparison and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to detect statistical signiﬁcance of the
respective variables between the two subsamples. The main ﬁndings are as follows. Firms
which went private later on were signiﬁcantly younger (mean: 11.63 years, median: 7
years) as compared to their counterparts in the control group (mean: 18.89 years, median:
9 years). In addition, our comparison of means indicates that ﬁrms which went private
again were also on average smaller at the time of the IPO in a number of dimensions.
This is the case with respect to sales (mean: 166.1 mill compared to 637.6 mill; median:
29.88 mill. USD compared to 60.36 mill USD) as well as with total assets (mean: 316.9mill
versus 1382mill; median: 50.01 mill versus 111.5 mill.). Diﬀerences between the two sub-
samples are signiﬁcant at the one percent level for these two size variables. In addition,
our univariate comparisons suggest that ﬁrms belonging to the going-private sample have
signiﬁcantly lower leverage and need less access to capital (as measured by the fact that
they have signiﬁcantly better relative cash holdings as well as paying less often dividends).
Somewhat surprising, our measure of capital constraints, the Kaplan-Zingales Index re-
veals that ﬁrms which go private later on have a much lower Kaplan-Zingales index than
their counterparts, thereby indicating less ﬁnancial constraints associated with the sample
of ﬁrms which goes private later on, but these diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Overall, this suggests that there are, already at the time of the IPO diﬀerences between
the two subsamples, i.e. those ﬁrms which remain on the exchange and those which do go
private later on.
Insert Table 2 here
Table 3 reveals that besides diﬀerences in initial conditions at the time of the IPO we also
observe diﬀerences with respect to ﬁve-year growth rates after the IPO.
6Insert Table 3 here
There are no clear-cut patterns in the diﬀerences of the growth path of ﬁrms in the
two diﬀerent subsamples. Often the diﬀerences between the two subsample vary in sign
when comparing the diﬀerences in means and the diﬀerences in median values, indicating
rather skewed distributions. This is true for example with regard to sales growth. With
respect to asset growth we ﬁnd that ﬁrms which grow faster are more likely to stay on
the exchanges while those which grow more slowly more often leave the exchange later
on. With respect to market value we ﬁnd that ﬁrms which go private tend to have a
smaller growth rate in market value. The change in capex/sales as well as the change in
market-to-book is smaller for the going-private ﬁrms compared to their counterparts in
the control group. The growth rate in cash/total assets is smaller with the going-private
subsample indicating that initial diﬀerences between the two subsamples became smaller
over time.
All this suggests that changes over time (i.e. after the IPO) and hence the development
of the ﬁrms diﬀer across the two types of ﬁrms. Thereby, we ﬁnd indication that ﬁrm
dynamics seem to have had an eﬀect on the going-private decision. This is, however,
deﬁnitively also true for ﬁrm characteristics at the time of the IPO. Firm characteristics
at the time of the IPO seem to have predictive power which of the ﬁrms will stay on the
exchange and for which this is only a temporary episode in the life-time of the company.
Hence, ﬁrms which share these characteristics can be called marginal ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms which
just were suitable for an IPO. The fact that we observe a very high proportion of VC-
backed ﬁrms which went private later on lets us conjecture that VCs are more able and
willing to bring such marginal ﬁrms to the public markets. An alternative interpretation is
that VCs are more likely to have invested in these marginal ﬁrms. That is, the alternative
interpretation is that ﬁrm characteristics, rather than the fact that the VC itself is able to
bring them to the public market, is responsible for the fact that we see more VC-backed
ﬁrms to eventually go private. A ﬁrst step towards disentangling these two interpretations
is to investigate potential diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics at the time of the IPO between
the sample of VC-backed ﬁrms and ﬁrms which have had no VC backing. Only if there
are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two, the alternative interpretation is a potential
candidate for explaining the observed patterns.
3.3.2 VC-backed vs non-VC-backed ﬁrms
Table 4 delineates potential diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics between VC-backed ﬁrms
and ﬁrms which did not have any VC capital at the time of their IPO. A look on this
table reveals that VC-backed ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from non-VC-backed IPOs
in a number of dimensions. First and foremost, we observe that VC-backed ﬁrms have
been signiﬁcantly younger at the time of the IPO as compared to their non-VC-backed
7counterparts. The diﬀerence in age amounts to 4 years with respect to the median and 8
years in the mean. Furthermore, VC-backed ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly smaller than non-VC
backed ﬁrms (wit respect to sales as well as to total assets). In addition, VC-backed ﬁrms
are on average more R&D intense and less levered (indicating their lower debt capacity).
Overall, this ﬁts quite well into the overall notion, that VCs invest in R&D intense, young
ﬁrms with rather few tangible assets.
Insert Table 4 here
Hence, we clearly see support for the selection hypothesis. But, even if there is a selection
eﬀect, this still might imply that VCs are better able to bring marginal ﬁrms to the ex-
change. In order to separate this eﬀect from the pure selection eﬀect, we need to control
for ﬁrm characteristics in a multivariate analysis. If, after controlling for these ﬁrm char-
acteristics, a signiﬁcant eﬀect of VC-backing at the time of the IPO remains, this would
strongly support our conjecture that it is indeed VC-backing per se which allows marginal
ﬁrms to go public (leading to a higher probability to go private once again later on). If
we get support for this conjecture in the course of our multivariate analysis, we turn to
the second issue, namely what drives this fact that VCs are more able and more willing
to bring marginal ﬁrms to the exchange.
Before, we move on, it is appropriate to discuss on potential caveat against this procedure,
namely the argument that not ﬁrm characteristics at the time of the IPO but rather at
the date at which the VC invests in the ﬁrm matters for the selection. Looking at ﬁrm
characteristics at this point in time (an information which is by the way not available to
us) however, overlooks
4 Analysis of going-private choice
We ﬁrst start with our analysis of going-private decision in a multivariate setting by
making use of the panel structure of our data set. The dependent variable is time since
the IPO. Thereby, we employ one of the most widely used duration model, the Cox
proportional hazard model. This particular type of a duration model is particularly helpful
when the exact time of each ’exit’ is known, a property which is fulﬁlled in our data set.
The proportional hazard model describes the (instantaneous) hazard function h(t)a sa
vector of explanatory variables x with unknown variables and h0 as the baseline hazard
rate: h(t)=h0ex
 
β. In our context, the hazard rate depicts for every particular ﬁrm the
probability of going private. More precisely, the instantaneous hazard rate h(t) denotes
the probability of going private in a (short) time spell (between t and t + dt) given
that it has not gone private up to t. The Cox proportional hazard model can be used
to estimate β without specifying the form of the baseline hazard function h0 (see Kiefer,
81988, p. 667). As such, the hazard rates (exp(x
 β)) are easily computable from the reported
coeﬃcients, which measures the economic signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates. The ﬁrst
two columns of table 5 present the result of the Cox regressions. These columns denote,
for given values of the independent variables, the conditional probability of going private.
Hence, the signs of the coeﬃcients are readily interpretable. A positive coeﬃcient implies
a higher probability of going private the larger is the value of the respective independent
variable. Conversely, a negative coeﬃcient implies that a higher value of the independent
variable is associated with a lower probability of going private. The estimation results of
the Cox proportional hazard model are displayed in Table 5. The interpretation of the
coeﬃcients is straightforward: they display the likelihood to go private as a consequence
of the increase of the independent variable by one unit. For example, the coeﬃcient of
1.813 in the ﬁrst column of our table denotes that the diﬀerences in the probability to
go private between VC-backed and non VC-backed ﬁrms is 181.3 percent. This implies
that if on average the going-private probability of a non-VC backed ﬁrm is 30 percent,
the respective probability of the VC-backed ﬁrm is 84 percent.
The results in table 5 reveal that the results of the univariate analysis in general carry
over to the Cox regressions: size, as measured by the sales variable as well as market
value has a negative eﬀect on the going-private probability. That is, smaller ﬁrms are
more likely to go private again. Younger ﬁrms (Age at the time of the IPO) display
a signiﬁcantly higher probability of going-private. In addition, the analysis reveals that
ﬁrms which pay little dividends (and hence have better ﬁnancing conditions) are more
likely to go private. For our purpose, the most important result, however, is that the VC-
backed variable remains highly signiﬁcant. This is true for both our Cox models where we
included in the second one a control variable which we consider to pick up the potential
selection eﬀect displayed by VC-backing, namely the R&D intensity of the ﬁrm. It turns
out, however, that this variable (which also leads to a rather sharp drop in the number
of observations) has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the going-private decision (see Table 5) and
leaves all the other factors, most notably the VC variable unchanged. Thereby, we note
the very pronounced statistical signiﬁcance level (at the one percent level) but also the
very pronounced signiﬁcance of the economic eﬀect.
Insert Table 5 here
In order to get a better understanding of the determinants of the going-private process,
which is then also helpful in analyzing the VC-backed phenomenon, it is decisive to ask
in a multivariate setting whether it is i) the development ﬁrms undertake when they are
listed or ii) ﬁrm as well as market characteristics which determined the going-private
decision. For this purpose we look into the explanatory power of a probit regression which
only focuses on variables which measure ﬁrm as well as market characteristics at the
time of the IPO. Our ﬁndings in column three of table 5 reveal that a number of ﬁrm
9characteristics at the time of the IPO have predictive power for the going-private decision
which takes place years later. This is true for the sales variable as well as for market value
variable both having a negative, statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. In addition, we ﬁnd a
negative and statistically signiﬁcant Kaplan-Zingales index, indicating that ﬁrms which
are ﬁnancially constraint seek access to public markets and hence stay on the exchange
while those with a low Kaplan-Zingales index are more likely to go private. Overall this
reinforces the ﬁndings of our univariate analysis. Furthermore and not astonishingly, the
fact that ﬁrms are VC-backed has also a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the going-
private decision in the probit regression.
Taking this together shows that initial ﬁrm characteristics matter at the time of the IPO.
This clearly suggests that “marginal ﬁrms measured at some critical characteristics (size,
age, ...) as well as the fact whether these ﬁrms are VC-backed are signiﬁcantly more
inclined to reverse their initial going public decision. From this observation, two decisive
questions arise. First, why do VCs have the ability but also willingness to bring these
marginal ﬁrms public? Second, how does “corporate-governance performance (i.e. turning
ﬁrst from a private company to a public one and then reverting eventually back) relate to
the ﬁnancial performance of ﬁrms while they are public? We address these two questions
in the following, while putting particular emphasis on the former one. In order to address
the ﬁrst question in some detail we ﬁrst address the existing literature on VC exit decisions
as well as on the IPO decision in general aiming to carve out some theoretical hypotheses
which allow us to address and potentially answer our ﬁrst question: why are VCs able
and willing to bring marginal ﬁrms public?
5 Potential reasons behind the VCs willingness/ability
to bring marginal ﬁrms public
Exit decisions are decisive in the investment cycle of the VC (see e.g. Black and Gilson
(1998)). There is a signiﬁcant body of literature dealing with many aspects of the exit
decisions. We focus in the following, however, on studies which are addressing potential
determinants behind the going public decision. For successful investments VCs face two
exit related decisions: the choice on exit mode as well as the choice on exit timing. We
identify three main arguments which could potentially answer why VCs are able and
willing to bring marginal ﬁrms public.
First, Lerner (1994) addresses the question whether VCs are indeed able to time the
market, i.e. bring their portfolios ﬁrms public especially und when equity valuations are
high. VCs are in most cases able to decide on the going public decisions of the portfolio
ﬁrms. Since VCs hold exit rights they have a crucial say not only on the exit mode but
also on exit timing in most of their ventures (see e.g. Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004)
and Bienz and Walz (2011)). Furthermore, VCs have an interest to time capital markets
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the time of the IPO (see Lin and Smith (1998)). This is due to two circumstances. On
the one hand, bringing portfolio ﬁrms public in hot-issue markets leads to less dilution
of the VC because a given sum of capital is collected with the issuance of a smaller
number of shares (see Barry, Muscarella, III, and Vetsuypens (1990)). On the other hand,
underpricing, which is cheaper in hot-issue markets, allows for the build-up of reputation
vis-a-vis investors in capital markets for the VC (see Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) for
evidence).
Lerner (1994) ﬁnds, that VCs indeed are timing the market, i.e. bringing overproportion-
ally many portfolio ﬁrms public, relative to a non-VC backed control group public during
hot-issue markets. Furthermore, he ﬁnds in his data set, that more experienced VCs are
most capable timing capital markets.
From these ﬁndings we derive our ﬁrst hypothesis
Hypothesis 1 Market timing: VCs are able to time capital markets allowing them
to bring marginal ﬁrms public in hot-issue markets. This market-timing ability is most
pronounced with seasoned VCs. Hence, we should expect that VC backed ﬁrms which go
public are most likely to go private later on. The highest likelihood of going private should
be observed for those ﬁrms backed by an experienced VC in a hot-issue phase of the capital
market at the time of the IPO.
Second, Gompers (1996) stressed that VCs have an incentive to grandstand. Especially,
new and inexperienced VCs have an incentive to signal their ability to the market, i.e. to
their potential investors. Given that VCs are typically organized as limited partnerships
and closed-end funds, they need to raise new capital when the life-time of a fund ends.
The main decision variable for investors (limited partners) is the quality of fund managers
(general partners) to select and nurture promising venture. Hence, general partners have
a strong incentive to convince potential limited partners about their abilities and to build
up a reputation of being a capable VC investor. One of the most obvious signals general
partners can send is to bring one of their portfolio ﬁrms public. Since the build up of
reputation is decisive for fund raising VCs are even willing to incur costs to build up such
reputation (e.g. in form of a higher degree of underpricing). Gompers (1996) argues that
while there is less necessity for older and reputable VCs to invest in reputation, especially
younger VCs have an incentive to incur the costs of investing in reputation. There, these
younger ﬁrms have an incentive to grandstand, that is, bring their portfolio ﬁrms public
more often and earlier as compared to established VCs. This notion of grandstanding
– and the associated willingness of less established VCs to incur the costs of bringing
portfolio companies to the public markets more often and sooner in the former of a higher
degree of underpricing – is supported by Lee and Wahal (2004b). They ﬁnd that indeed
the degree of underpricing depends negatively on VCs reputation (measured by VC age
and the number of previously conducted IPOs by this VC ﬁrm).
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panies to the public markets. These ﬁrms are less mature and less likely to beneﬁt from
public markets while at the same time are less able to bear the costs of being public
(e.g. lacking a big shareholder). Hence, we would expect these ﬁrms to share a higher
probability of going private later on once again.
This leads us to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Grandstanding: VCs with a lower level of reputational capital (i.e.
younger VCs and those with fewer previous IPOs) are more likely to bring marginal ﬁrms
to the public markets. Firms backed by those VCs have a higher likelihood to go private
again later on.
A third line of argument goes back to Megginson and Weiss (1991). They argue against the
background of their observation that VC-backed IPOs were less underpriced than their non
VC-backed counterpart, that VC certify the quality of their portfolio ﬁrms and hence may
overcome informational asymmetries. This certiﬁcation ability of VCs (see on a discussion
of the certiﬁcation hypothesis e.g. Li and Masulis (2006) and Lee and Wahal (2004a)) may
allow them to bring marginal ﬁrms to the markets. Especially experienced VCs should be
most able to exercise this certiﬁcation role. This is in line with a recent study by Nahata
(2008) who shows that portfolio ﬁrms which are backed by more reputable VC are more
likely to go public and access public market faster. In addition, his ﬁndings imply that
experienced and reputable VCs back ﬁrms which are more successful as measured by asset
productivity. We conjecture that these marginal ﬁrms are then among the ﬁrst to leave
public markets later on. In the group of VC-backed ﬁrms this argument would imply that
especially ﬁrms backed by experienced and reputable VCs are the ones who are most
likely to leave the public market via a going-private decision. 1
We therefore can state for our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Certiﬁcation: VCs are able to certify the quality of their ﬁrms, thereby
enabling them to bring ﬁrms to public markets at lower costs. These ﬁrms are then more
likely to go private later on once again. Since established VCs are obviously best suited
to certify the quality of their ﬁrms, ﬁrms backed these established VCs are most prone to
leave the public exchange later on.
1A seemingly similar argument, namely the one of Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990)
who argue that lower underpricing in VC-backed IPOs is driven by the capability of VCs to select and
monitor the portfolio ﬁrms properly has quite diﬀerent implications in our context. Better screening and
monitor makes VC-backed ﬁrms more mature allowing them to do better in public markets as compared to
their counterparts. If this selection and monitoring mechanism does not show up in our ﬁrm characteristics
we are controlling for we should observed less VC backed ﬁrms to go private once again. If selection and
monitoring is revealed in the control variable we should not observe an eﬀect.
126 Hypotheses tests
We approach our hypotheses empirically by introducing proper proxies for our hypotheses
in our standard Cox regression.
We start by addressing the hot-issue market hypothesis (see table 6). We employ
three diﬀerent proxies for hot-issues markets. The ﬁrst is the most natural and direct
proxy: the number of IPOs at the time of the IPO (see also Ritter (1984) on this in his
classical article on hot-issue markets). Secondly, we control for the sizes of the respective
IPOs by using the aggregate IPO proceeds in the ﬁscal year in which the respective ﬁrm
went public. Our third proxy variable measures the annual returns in the NASDAQ for
the ﬁscal year in which the respective ﬁrm went public. In all our regression we rely on
our standard Cox regression set-up from the previous section. For all three proxies we
look into the role of hot-issue markets per se as well as on the role of hot-issue markets for
VC-backed IPOs. We ﬁnd a rather clear-cut picture which does not support hypothesis 1.
While ﬁrms which went public in a hot-issue market are signiﬁcantly more likely to leave
the exchange after a couple of years, the same is not true for VC-backed IPOs. Just to the
contrary, VC-backed ﬁrms which went public in hot-issue markets are signiﬁcantly less
likely to go private later on. These ﬁndings are very strong for two of our proxy variable,
the IPO proceeds variable as well as the NASDAQ variable, while we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
relationship for number of IPOs variable. With the two former variables the coeﬃcient of
the variable itself is positive and highly signiﬁcant. However, the interaction term of these
variable with the VC dummy is negative and also signiﬁcant. This implies that in general
ﬁrms which went public in hot-issue markets have a signiﬁcantly higher likelihood to go
private, whereas the opposite is true for VC-backed ﬁrms.
Insert Table 6 here
Our interpretation of this ﬁnding is that it seems to be indeed the case that during hot-
issue markets marginal ﬁrms (i.e. those ﬁrms which just ﬁt to the exchange) go public. This
general ﬁnding does not apply for VC-backed ﬁrms. Just to the contrary: VCs accompany
signiﬁcantly less marginal ﬁrms to the exchange during hot-issue markets. Figure 1) clearly
supports this view. It reveals that VCs rather than contributing to hot-issue markets
almost do the opposite: the higher the number of IPOs in a particular year, the lower
is the share of VCs in particular and vice versa. The correlation coeﬃcient between the
total number of IPOs and the share of VC-backed IPOs for the post 1980 period (before
1980 too few observations distorts the picture) is negative (-0.469) and highly signiﬁcant
diﬀerent from zero (at the one percent level).
We address the grandstanding and the certiﬁcation hypothesis jointly. In order to test
the two hypotheses we need to establish proxies for VC-experience and reputation. The
most direct variable which measures the experience of the VC ﬁrm is the age of the VC
13ﬁrm at the time of the IPO of the portfolio ﬁrm (AGE-VC). We thereby rely on the VC
ﬁrm rather than the VC fund since the information on the VC ﬁrm reﬂects the ability
of the VC ﬁrm to raise follow-on funds allowing them to invest in further portfolio ﬁrms.
Raising follow-on funds requires, however, suﬃcient performance which makes investors
inclined to invest in the follow-on fund of the VC ﬁrm once again. Hence, the age of the
VC ﬁrm also measures the quality of the VC ﬁrm. In contrast, the age of the VC fund
is a simple indication of the speed at which the particular VC fund invest his committed
capital in portfolio ﬁrms. There is little, if any relationship to the experience of the VC.
There is, however, some noise associated with the age of the VC variable, especially for
captive VCs such as bank-dependent VCs for which this variable sometimes measure the
age of the parent company. In order to avoid this to happen, we exclude all VC ﬁrms
which are indicated to be older than 60 years.
As a second variable we make use of the fact that we have information on the number of
previous IPOs of the VC ﬁrm. VCs exit their most successful ﬁrms via an IPO (see Giot
and Schwienbacher (2007) and H. and Cochrane (2005)) making the number of previous
IPOs not only an indicator of VC-experience but also of reputation. We refer to this
variable as NUMBER-IPO-VC. Third, we employ the information on the type of the VC.
We distinguish captive VCs from independent once. It has often been argued and shown
that the latter type of VC is more active in their portfolio ﬁrms and therefore more able
to certify the quality of the portfolio ﬁrm (see e.g. Hirsch and Walz (2012))). Therefore,
we create a dummy on the VC type which take a value of one if the VC is an independent
VC and zero if it is a captive VC (DUMMY-INDEPENDENT).
Last but not least, we employ a variable which has been proposed and used recently by
Nahata (2008) in his study on VC performance. He constructs a variable which measure
each VC’s ﬁrm share in the accumulated market capitalization of VC-backed IPOs up to
the year of the IPO of the respective VC-backed ﬁrm. In order to do so he adds up the
market capitalization of all previous IPOs of the VC ﬁrm up to (and including it) to the
IPO of the respective VC-backed ﬁrm. This number is then divided by the accumulated
market share (up to this point in time) of all VC-backed IPOs. We refer to this variable
as MARKET-SHARE-MCAP-VC.
Surprisingly, these variables are little correlated. The strongest correlation exists between
the NUMBER-IPO-VC variable and AGE-VC variable (0.189). Both variables are little
correlated with the MARKET-SHARE-MCAP-VC variable. The correlation coeﬃcient
of this variable with number of previous IPOs of the respective VC ﬁrm is even slightly
negative (-0.0035) while the other correlation coeﬃcient is 0.0234.
In order to test our grandstanding and certiﬁcation we use our standard Cox regression
and add these four proxies for VC experience and reputation in diﬀerent regressions.
First, we use the four diﬀerent VC proxies, while testing them in a second step jointly
into the Cox regression. While the grandstanding hypothesis would suggest that we get
negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for all four variables the opposite holds
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7 indicate that the number of IPOs brought to the market by the respective VC as well
as the VC age variable do not have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the going-private
decision. Both coeﬃcients are positive but far from being statistically signiﬁcant. The
picture is quite diﬀerent when we turn to the variable which measures VC experience
and reputation via the role of the respective VC in the IPO market, namely through the
accumulated sum of the market capitalizations of this VC, relative to the overall market
capitalization of all VC backed IPOs. This measures which takes care of diﬀerent sizes of
IPOs and weighs larger IPOs stronger has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact
on the going-private decision (see model 3 in Table 7). This eﬀect remains robust when
we insert all the four variables measuring VC experience and reputation in the standard
Cox regression (see model 5 in Table 7). Very much the same result emerges for the VC
type variable: the eﬀect of the dummy variable indicating that an independent VC which
has been backing the portfolio ﬁrm is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (see model 4 in
Table 7). This eﬀect, once again, carries over to the full model with all proxy variables
representing VC experience and reputation (see model 5 in Table 7). Taking these ﬁndings
together, we can interpret our ﬁndings as clear support for the certiﬁcation hypothesis.
More experienced and reputable VCs are better equipped to bring marginal ﬁrms to the
exchange. Our results also indicate a clear rejection of the grandstanding hypothesis. We
ﬁnd no support for the conjecture that especially young and unexperienced VCs have had
the ability to bring marginal ﬁrms to the exchange.
Insert Table 7 here
It is interesting to view our results against the background of the ﬁndings of Nahata
(2008). Nahata (2008) shows that experienced and reputable VCs (as measured by the
MARKET-SHARE-MCAP-VC variable) are more likely to exit their ventures successful
venture. He also ﬁnds that more reputable VCs exit their ventures faster. We complete this
picture of the evolution of VC-backed ﬁrms, by adding a, what we think very important
piece. Our ﬁndings clearly suggest that this success, at least from a corporate governance
point of view is only a temporary one. Firms backed by more reputable and experience
ﬁrms seem to be more likely to be successful (with respect to the exit per se, but also as
suggested by Nahata (2008) with respect to asset productivity), but of those ﬁrms which
end on listed exchanges via an IPO, the ones with a backing of a more reputable are
also signiﬁcantly more likely to go private later on again. Hence, we can stress that for
many VC-backed ﬁrms in general, the IPO is not the ﬁnal step in the ﬁrm’s corporate
governance, but rather a temporary one. This in particular true for ﬁrms backed by
reputable and experienced VCs. All this sheds very strong doubts on the view which at
least implicitly exists in the literature on venture capital: the IPOs as the silver bullet for
the portfolio ﬁrms. Rather, it seems to be the case that being listed is only a temporary
part of the life-time of formerly VC-backed ﬁrms. The certiﬁcation ability of the VCs
15allows marginal ﬁrms to become a public company but after the VC has left the ﬁrm
(entirely) being public obviously proves to be not optimal anymore, i.e. ﬁrms go private
once again.
Finally, we address the question, whether VCs pay for their ability to exit marginal ﬁrms
through an IPO via a large degree of underpricing (i.e. leaving suﬃciently much on the
table in the course of an IPO). In order to do we regress the level of underpricing on
ﬁrm as well as VC characteristics (see Table 8). We ﬁnd rather little support for this
mechanism (see Table 8). The variable which proved to be signiﬁcant in the test of the
certiﬁcation hypothesis has no explanatory power in the underpricing regression. Only
the variable measuring the number of previously initiated IPOs by the respective VC has
a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect. Our interpretation of this ﬁnding is that more reputable
and experienced VC ﬁrms are able per se to overcome informational asymmetries rather
than having to underprice their issues in order to allow for successful IPOs.
Insert Table 8 here
7 Extensions and robustness
In order to strengthen our arguments and provide for a better understanding of the
underlying mechanisms we ﬁrstly extend our analysis and consider further potential de-
terminants of the going-private decisions. Secondly, we provide a number of robustness
checks for our results.
7.1 Financial and operative performance
Up to now we have based our analysis on the assumption that the going-private decision
is driven by corporate governance considerations. A further hypothesis obviously is that
the going-private decision is (also) determined by the ﬁrms’ performance: Firms which are
doing badly in terms of ﬁnancial performance (i.e. with regard to stock price developments)
as well as with regard to operational performance will eventually leave the exchange
and become private. A look into the descriptive statistics suggests that operative and
ﬁnancial performance seem to play an important role in the going-public decision. Table
9 reveals signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the change of various operational performance measures
between the going-private subsample and the control group with the former displaying
a signiﬁcantly more negative trend. Obviously the deteriorating performance added to
the increased likelihood to go private. The diﬀerence in performance changes is persistent
across diﬀerent time periods (3, 5 and 10 years) as well as across diﬀerent proﬁtability
measures (i.e. ebit/assets as well as net income/equity). Only for the 10 year’s period
16the diﬀerences becomes statistically less signiﬁcant which is not least due to the fact that
the sample of ﬁrms which went private becomes signiﬁcantly smaller after 10 years. This
diﬀerence in proﬁtability changes is also existing between the VC-backed and the non-
VC-backed sample. This ﬁnding is rather little surprising given the large dominance of
VC-backed ﬁrms in the going private sample.
Insert Table 9 here
Table 9 also reveals signiﬁcant diﬀerences in ﬁnancial performance between the going-
private sample and the control group of ﬁrms. Firms in the going-private sample have
performed substantially worse with regard to the development of share prices as compared
to ﬁrms which remained on the exchange. While median share prices for ﬁrms eventually
went private decreased in all time periods considered (3, 5 and 10 years), the opposite
is true for ﬁrms which stood on the exchange. The diﬀerences between the two type’s
ﬁnancial performance is statistically as well as economically signiﬁcant. The diﬀerences
between the two samples are for the median ﬁrms close to 10 percent p.a. for the 3 year-
period and after all for the 5 and 10 year-periods more than 7 and 3 percent respectively.
Pretty much the same pattern can be observed when comparing VC with non-VC backed
ﬁrms.
Against this background, the obvious question is whether our main story, namely that
VCs are more likely and able to bring marginal ﬁrms to the exchange is robust if we
control for ﬁnancial as well as operating. In the strict sense, the answer is clearly to the
aﬃrmative. The results of the logit regression in which we only include variables at the
time of the IPO and ask whether these variable (including the VC-backing dummy) do
have predictive power for the ﬁrm’s probability to go private is not inﬂuenced by the
performance consideration, which occur later on. In a more general sense, we have to ask
ourselves whether the inclusion of ﬁnancial and operative performance does have an eﬀect
on the VC-backing dummy in the Cox regression.
Insert Table 10 here
Table 10 aims to answer this period. It turns out, that despite the fact that at least
ﬁnancial performance has a signiﬁcant impact on the going-private probability (see mod-
els (1)-(3) in Table 10), our overall story remains unaltered. The VC-backed variable re-
mains highly signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of the VC-backed variable is only slightly reduced.
Hence, even after taking post-IPO operative and ﬁnancial performance into account, the
basic ﬁnding, that VC-backing increases very strongly the likelihood that ﬁrms goes public
remains intact. What about the tests of our hypotheses. Once, again the Cox regression
in table 10 try to give an answer on this (see models (4) and (5)). The results signal the
robustness of our ﬁndings in this respect as well. All our ﬁndings on the underpricing
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(5)) go through. The latter results become even slightly stronger. Hence, we can conclude
that all our results are robust vis-a-vis the inclusion of measures for operational as well
as ﬁnancial performance.
7.2 Impact of IPO year
Our data sample embraces quite a long time period. During this time period we observe a
number of features which vary over time, as indicated in our discussion of the aggregated
data. Most notably, we observe a signiﬁcant increase in the hoing-private transactions in
the post 1990 period as compared to the situation prior to 1990. Against this background
it seems appropriate to check whether the patterns we have carved out in our discussion
so far hold true for the entire time period or are driven by subperiods in which market
transactions (in either direction, i.e., going-private or going-public) has been especially
active. For example, are the ﬁrms which went public in the dot-com bubble years signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent as compared to the other ﬁrms, with a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent going-private
pattern? There exist a number of potential approaches to address this potential problem.
First, we could have split the sample into parts, e.g. in a subsample of ﬁrms which have
had their IPO prior to 1998 and those which went public post 1998. The problem with
this approach is that it distorts against the latter subsample in the sense that these ﬁrms
are on average public for a much shorter average time period since our observation pe-
riod ends 2011. An even more problematic way to deal with the issue would have been
to split the sample according to the going-private years: to divide along the lines of the
going-private years (e.g. considering in one sample only the going private years post 1998
and pre-1998). This would have introduced a high degree of endogeneity into our sample
split.
We therefore chose what we think is the most appropriate way to address the issue: to
allow for IPO-ﬁxed eﬀects which control for unobserved eﬀects of the years in which
the respective ﬁrms went public. We introduce these IPO year ﬁxed eﬀects into our Cox
regression with which we test our hypothesis. Allowing for IPO year ﬁxed eﬀects leaves
our results unchanged. All our previous results carry over to the inclusion of the IPO year
controls (see Table 10).
Insert Table 11 here
7.3 Diﬀerent Going-Private Modes
So far, we have compared two types of ﬁrms. Firms which left the exchange either because
they were merged with or acquired by another ﬁrm or because they were delisted but still
18existing (the CRSP 200 and 500 codes, respectively) with the control group (all other
ﬁrms). By allowing for diﬀerent sample splits we ask whether our results are robust vis-a-
vis the precise going-private mode of our going-private subsample but also by with regard
to a diﬀerent composition of the control group. As a ﬁrst step. we address the latter
step and eliminate all ﬁrms in the control group which eventually went bankrupt (and
therefore left the exchange while not being involved in an active going-private decision).
We ﬁnd that the elimination of these ﬁrms (about 200 ﬁrms) leave our basic ﬁnding as
well as the hypotheses test unchanged. We achieve similar ﬁnings if we drop in a second
step the delisting cases from our going-private subsample (the 500 codes in CRSP, about
950 ﬁrms). This change in sample composition leads to (small) changes in the coeﬃcients
but not of the level of statistical and economic signiﬁcance.
An obviously interesting question is whether ﬁrms which are bought by private equity
investors in the course of the going-private process (typically referred to a leveraged buy-
out) follow the same mechanisms as the ones described above. That is, are ﬁrms which
are initially backed by VCs (an active investor) are more likely to go private once again
into the hands of another active investors which takes the ﬁrm private in order to e.g.
improve its corporate governance? In this particular case we could interpret the being-
public spell as a temporary exception to the ﬁrm’s long-run need for an active investor who
controls the ﬁrm tightly. Unfortunately we are not able to check this directly, since we are
lacking data on the whether ﬁrms went private in the course of a leveraged buyout. But
we are able to look into this issue indirectly by focusing on those ﬁrms only which went
private and where shareholders received cash payments only. Obviously the class of ﬁrms
is larger than the one of leveraged buyouts, but contains leveraged buyouts. Undertaken
this sample split allows us to provide an aﬃrmative answers to the above question. Even
if we only compare these ﬁrms (which are in the 233 code of CRSP) with all ﬁrms in
the control group our qualitative ﬁndings remain unchanged. This suggests that there
are indeed ﬁrms which stay only temporarily on the exchange, starting as VC-backed
ﬁrm (at the IPO) and going private (via a leverage buyout). Furthermore, being acquired
in the course of a leverage buyout is more likely for initially VC-backed ﬁrms, a quite
surprising and highly interesting result which calls for further research on the details of
the mechanics behind this.
8 Conclusion
The main aim of this paper was to investigate the observed patterns associated with the
going-public and going-private process: namely that ﬁrms backed by VC in the course of
their IPO are much more likely to revert this step and turn private again. In a ﬁrst step,
we showed by using ﬁrm and market characteristics in Cox proportional hazard model
that the impact of the VC-backed variable on the going-private probability survives a
more thorough analysis. When investigating the determinants of the ability of VCs to
19bring marginal ﬁrms to the exchange we found a rather clear-cut picture and evidence for
the ability of experienced and reputable VCs to signal the quality of the ﬁrm, i.e. certify
this vis-a-vis potential shareholder, even without having to pay for this via underpricing.
Thereby, we not only shed new light on the determinants of the going-private process.
Even more importantly we allow for a quite diﬀerent interpretation of VC exits via an
IPO. Rather than being the silver bullet and the ﬁnal step in the life-time of a ﬁrm,
we show that it is more likely only a temporary step of the ﬁrm which is made possi-
ble by experienced and reputable VCs backing the company and allowing to overcome
informational asymmetries vis-a-vis potential shareholders in public markets.
Obviously there are a number of routes this issue can be taken in future research. What role
do private equity ﬁrms (as successors of VCs ﬁrms in overtaking concentrated ownership)
play in the going-private decision of initially VC-backed ﬁrms. To what extent are the
dynamics of the VCs divestment in and after the IPO govern the going-private decision
in general and its speed in particular?
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25Table 2: Comparison – going private subsample ; date of IPO
In this table we display the main ﬁrm characteristics for our two subsamples: the going private subsample as well as the
control group at the time of the IPO of the respective ﬁrm. We present means as well as medians and report potential
signiﬁcance levels of the comparison between the two groups. +++, ++, + (***, **, *) represent signiﬁcance levels for
diﬀerences in means (medians) at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively.
Going private subsample Still public
Variable Obs Mean Median Sig. Sig Obs Mean Median
Age at IPO 1924 11.69 7 +++ ∗∗∗ 1892 18.89 9
FCF/Total assets 2187 -0.077 0.029 ∗∗∗ 3286 -0.057 0.052
Market value 2358 400.6 104.1 +++ ∗∗∗ 3553 873.4 148.2
Sales 2503 166.1 29.88 +++ ∗∗∗ 3907 637.6 60.36
Total assets 2512 314.9 50.01 +++ ∗∗∗ 3940 1382 111.5
Market-to-Book value 2346 3.909 2.408 ∗∗∗ 3484 6.556 1.722
Kaplan-Zingales index 1780 0.403 0.617 ∗∗∗ 2331 1.356 0.549
R&D intensity 1643 3.082 0.139 ∗∗∗ 1925 3.048 0.045
Leverage 2505 0.113 0.018 +++ ∗∗∗ 3924 0.151 0.050
Capex/sales 2375 1.190 0.065 ∗∗∗ 3475 1.737 0.051
Cash/Total assets 2509 0.395 0.371 +++ ∗∗∗ 3930 0.263 0.124
Dividend Dummy 2559 0.307 0 +++ ∗∗∗ 4180 0.424 0
Table 3: Comparison – going private subsample ; 5 year after IPO
In this table we display the development of main ﬁrm characteristics for our two subsamples for the 5 years following the
IPO: the going private subsample as well as the control group. We present means as well as medians and report potential
signiﬁcance levels of the comparison between the two groups. +++, ++, + (***, **, *) represent signiﬁcance levels for
diﬀerences in means (medians) at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively.
Going private subsample Still public
Variable Obs Mean Median Sig. Sig. Obs Mean Median
Sales growth (in %) 1198 1.679 0.941 +++ ∗ 2894 1.613 1.016
Asset growth (in %) 1309 1.384 0.606 ++ ∗∗∗ 3071 1.536 0.924
Leverage growth 919 0.360 -0.337 ∗∗∗ 2296 0.360 -0.127
Change in market value 1182 0.621 -0.083 +++ ∗∗∗ 2685 1.271 0.535
Change in Capex/sales 1231 0.066 -0.389 +++ ∗∗∗ 2623 0.207 -0.174
Change in market-to-book 1226 -0.059 -0.292 +++ ∗∗∗ 2988 0.050 -0.067
Change in FCF/Total assets 1085 -17.26 -0.186 ∗∗∗ 2518 -2.486 -0.008
Change in Cash/Total assets 1326 -0.013 -0.345 +++ ∗∗∗ 3093 0.132 -0.265
26Table 4: Comparison – VC-backed versus non-VC-backed ﬁrms; date of IPO
In this table we display the main ﬁrm characteristics for our two subsamples: the VC-backed and the non VC-backed
companies. We present means as well as medians and report potential signiﬁcance levels of the comparison between the two
groups. +++, ++, + (***, **, *) represent signiﬁcance levels for diﬀerences in means (medians) at the 1, 5, 10 percent
level, respectively.
VC-backed Non VC-backed
Variable Obs Mean Median Sig. Sig Obs Mean Median
Age at IPO 2567 12.75 7 +++ ∗∗∗ 1246 20.67 11
FCF/Total assets 2678 -0.063 0.039 ∗∗∗ 2786 -0.069 0.048
Market value 2827 599.8 161.1 ++ ∗∗∗ 2940 791.9 93.92
Sales 3027 208.6 38.08 +++ ∗∗∗ 3370 677.8 49.01
Total assets 3030 313.3 66.69 +++ ∗∗∗ 3405 1555 94.33
Market-to-Book value 2823 4.128 2.558 ∗∗∗ 2864 6.961 1.455
Kaplan-Zingales index 2324 0.372 0.639 ∗∗∗ 1759 1.707 0.483
R&D intensity 2101 3.693 0.146 ∗∗∗ 1464 2.129 0.024
Leverage 3019 0.123 0.018 +++ ∗∗∗ 3392 0.153 0.062
Capex/sales 2907 0.934 0.066 ∗∗∗ 2933 1.885 0.047
Cash/Total assets 3026 0.419 0.406 +++ ∗∗∗ 3395 0.215 0.095
Dividend Dummy 3052 0.316 0 +++ ∗∗∗ 3673 0.434 0
Table 5: Probability to go private
In this table we present our multivariate estimations. The ﬁrst two models are display Cox regression with the left hand
side representing the time since IPO. The third model displays a probit regression with the going private dummy which is
one if the ﬁrm has left the exchange at a certain point in time while being zero if the ﬁrm is still public.
Cox regression Cox regression Probit
Coeﬃcients z Coeﬃcient z Coeff. z
Log Sales -0.187 -10.00 -0.193 -7.95 -0.076 -3.33
Capex/Sales -0.030 -1.63 -0.037 -0.96 0.001 0.49
Dividend Dummy -0.204 -2.57 -0.116 -1.13 -0.056 -0.93
Market-to-Book -0.075 -4.89 -0.074 -4.44 -0.005 -0.85
Total Assets 0.000 2.75 -0.000 -0.83 0.000 1.65
Market value -0.000 -2.34 -0.000 -1.08 -0.000 -1.83
FCF/Total Assets -0.128 -6.37 -0.115 -5.01 -0.486 -3.69
Leverage 0.102 1.27 0.110 1.29 0.058 0.36
Cash/Assets -0.779 -5.77 -0.708 -4.54 -0.346 -2.60
VC-backed 1.813 22.30 1.748 16.69 1.372 22.24
Age-at-IPO -0.003 -1.71 -0.003 -1.10 -0.002 -1.47
Kaplan-Zingales Dummy -0.069 -0.98 0.010 0.12 -0.138 -1.91
R&D Intensity -0.006 -1.48
Industry + year dummies yes yes yes
No of observ 28397 18494 3129
27Table 6: Testing the hot-issue market hypothesis
In this table we test our hot-issue market hypothesis. All models display Cox regressions with the left hand side representing
the time since IPO. We use three proxies for hot-issue markets. First, we resort to the number of IPOs which have taken
place in the same ﬁscal year as the particular ﬁrm went public (No IPOs at time of IPO). Second, we use the IPO proceeds
in the year of the IPO of the particular ﬁrm (IPO proceeds). Third, we use the total annual returns in the NASDAQ as
proxy for a hot issue market.
Cox regression Cox regression Cox regression
Coeﬃcients z Coeﬃcient z Coeﬃcient z
Log Sales -0.185 -9.85 -0.184 -9.78 -0.185 -9.85
No IPOs at time of IPO 0.001 1.48
No IPOs * VC dummy -0.000 -0.27
IPO proceeds 0.000 6.48
IPO proceeds * VC dummy -0.000 -5.67
Nasdaq 0.000 5.97
Nasdaq * VC dummy -0.000 -6.30
Capex/Sales -0.031 -1.62 -0.030 -1.61 -0.030 -1.61
Dividend Dummy -0.193 -2.42 -0.186 -2.34 -0.202 -2.54
Market value -0.000 -2.33 -0.000 -2.49 -0.000 -2.50
Total Assets 0.000 2.66 0.000 2.76 0.000 2.80
Market-to-book -0.073 -4.77 -0.073 -4.79 -0.074 -4.85
FCF/Total Asset -0.125 -6.25 -0.128 -6.36 -0.128 -6.40
Leverage 0.101 1.27 0.099 1.24 0.102 1.28
Cash/Assets -0.789 -5.85 -0.801 -5.91 -0.773 -5.71
VC-backed 1.878 9.14 2.54 15.74 2.34 18.56
Age-at-IPO -0.003 -1.61 -0.003 -1.58 -0.003 -1.70
Kaplan-Zingales Dummy -0.069 -1.00 -0.065 -0.93 -0.067 -0.95
Industry + year dummies yes yes yes
No of observ 28397 28397 28397
28Table 7: Testing the grandstanding and the certiﬁcation hypotheses
In this table we test the grandstanding as well as the certiﬁcation hypothesis. All models display Cox regressions with the
left hand side representing a dummy which is one if the particular ﬁrm has left the exchange in the year under observation
and zero otherwise. Besides the variables used in our standard Cox regression we employ four proxies with which we test
the gradstanding as well as the certiﬁcation hypotheses. These variables are: the number of IPOs the VC who backs the
particular company has undertaken (Number-IPO-VC), the age of the VC ﬁrm at the time of the IPO (Age-VC), the
cumulative market share of the VC in total market capitalizations of IPOs up to the year of the IPO (Market-share-
mcap-VC) as well as a dummy taking a value of one if the VC is an independent VC or zero if the VC is a captive VC
(Dummy-independent).
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Coeﬃcients z Coeﬃcient z Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Log Sales -0.187 -9.96 -0.187 -10.00 -0.187 -10.01 -0.190 -10.09 -0.190 -10.10
Capex/Sales -0.030 -1.62 -0.030 -1.63 -0.030 -1.62 -0.031 -1.65 -0.031 -1.64
Dividend Dummy -0.204 -2.56 -0.204 -2.57 -0.202 -2.56 -0.200 -2.50 -0.197 -2.47
Market value -0.000 -2.34 -0.000 -2.34 -0.000 -2.33 -0.000 -2.30 -0.000 -2.30
Total Assets 0.000 2.75 0.000 2.75 0.000 2.75 0.000 2.73 0.000 2.73
Market-to-book -0.074 -4.89 -0.075 -4.89 -0.075 -4.86 -0.074 -4.78 -0.073 -4.76
FCF/Total Asset -0.128 -6.37 -0.127 -6.37 -0.128 -6.33 -0.125 -6.26 -0.125 -6.22
Leverage 0.102 1.27 0.102 1.27 0.104 1.30 0.104 1.28 0.105 1.31
Cash/Assets -0.783 -5.79 -0.780 -5.78 -0.784 -5.81 -0.819 -6.03 -0.822 -6.04
VC-backed 1.81 22.14 1.81 22.14 1.81 22.23 1.71 19.21 1.71 19.10
Age-at-IPO -0.003 -1.71 -0.003 -1.72 -0.003 -1.69 -0.003 -1.68 -0.003 -1.66
Kaplan-Zingales Dummy -0.069 -0.98 -0.06 -0.98 -0.071 -1.01 -0.071 -1.01 -0.072 -1.03
Number-IPO-VC 0.0003 0.45 -0.0001 -0.13
Age-VC 0.0003 0.28 -0.0001 -0.06
Market-share-mcap-VC 1.322 2.14 1.34 2.13
Dummy-Independent 0.175 2.89 0.177 2.85
Industry + year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
No of observ 28397 28397 28397 28397 28397
Table 8: Underpricing
In this table we explore determinants of underpricing. We regress the level of underpricing (market price at the end of the
ﬁrst day of trading relative to the issue price) on ﬁrm as well as VC characteristics
Coeﬃcients t Coeﬃcient t Coeﬃcient t
Log Sales 0.041 1.04 0.041 1.04 0.041 1.04
Total Assets -0.000 -0.39 -0.000 -0.39 -0.000 -0.39
Market-to-book 0.022 2.72 0.022 2.72 0.022 2.72
FCF/Total Asset -0.0098 -0.04 -0.0099 -0.04 -0.0100 -0.04
Leverage -0.201 -0.63 -0.201 -0.63 -0.201 -0.62
Cash/Assets 0.494 1.91 0.494 1.91 0.497 1.90
Age-at-IPO -0.0016 -0.53 -0.0016 -0.53 -0.0016 -0.53
Capex/Sales -0.010 -0.18 -0.010 -0.18 -0.010 -0.18
Num-IPOs-at-IPO 0.0006 1.91 0.0006 1.91 0.0006 1.91
Dummy-Independent -0.090 -0.69 -0.093 -0.79 -0.090 -0.69
Age-at-IPO-VC -0.0002 -0.05 -0.0002 -0.05
Market-share-mcap-VC 0.052 0.02 0.054 0.02
No of observ 3141 3141 3141
Adj. R2 0.0039 0.0039 0.0036
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30Table 10: Impact of ﬁnancial and operative performance
In this table we check the robustness of our ﬁndings by controlling for the ﬁnancial and operative performance of the ﬁrms.
All models display Cox regressions with the left hand side representing a dummy which is one if the particular ﬁrm has
left the exchange in the year under observation and zero otherwise. We use three main variables to control for ﬁnancial
and operative performance: the 5-year growth rate of net income /equity and of ebit/assets for operative and the ﬁve-year
growth rate of the share price for ﬁnancial performance.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
Coeﬀ. z Coeﬀ. z Coeﬀ. z Coeﬀ. z Coeﬀ. z
Log Sales -0.222 -9.56 -0.220 -9.49 -0.204 -9.43 -0.202 -8.09 -0.211 -8.39
Capex/Sales -0.049 -1.31 -0.049 -1.30 -0.019 -1.27 -0.036 -1.06 -0.040 -1.16
Dividend Dummy -0.311 -2.97 -0.316 -3.01 -0.230 -2.43 -0.276 -2.53 -0.279 -2.55
Market value -0.000 -1.80 -0.000 -1.80 -0.000 -2.00 -0.000 -1.96 -0.000 -1.74
Total Assets 0.000 2.61 0.000 2.61 0.000 2.53 0.000 2.68 0.000 2.54
Market-to-book -0.049 -2.59 -0.049 -2.57 -0.077 -3.82 -0.055 -2.38 -0.055 -2.38
FCF/Total Asset -0.07 -2.67 -0.07 -2.66 -0.098 -4.43 -0.072 -2.50 -0.068 -2.33
Leverage 0.052 0.60 0.052 0.60 0.260 2.57 0.262 2.41 0.239 2.17
Cash/Assets -0.864 -4.64 -0.865 -4.64 -0.820 -5.03 -0.783 -3.98 -0.811 -4.09
VC-backed 1.50 16.15 1.50 16.14 1.84 19.74 2.37 12.92 1.49 13.05
Age-at-IPO -0.003 -1.06 -0.0025 -1.09 -0.001 -0.59 -0.003 -1.24 -0.006 -1.67
Kaplan-Zingales Dummy -0.060 -0.64 -0.059 -0.63 -0.051 -0.60 -0.102 -0.99 -0.086 -0.84
IPO gross proceeds 0.0000 5.11
IPO grpr* VC dummy -0.0000 -5.79
Age-VC -0.006 -1.67
Market-share-mcap-VC 0.206 2.16
Dummy-Independent 5.389 2.33
5y gr Ebit/total assets 0.002 0.48 0.004 0.95 0.0028 0.70
5y gr NI/Equity -0.0001 0.0003 0.67 0.0001 0.37
5y gr share price 0.022 2.24 -0.036 -1.38 -0.037 -1.48
Industry + year ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes
No of observ 25503 25520 24890 23949 23949
Table 11: Impact of IPO time periods/years
In this table we check the robustness of our ﬁndings by controlling for the years in which the respective ﬁrms went public.
We test the hot-issue market, the grandstanding as well as the certiﬁcation hypothesis by allowing for IPO-year ﬁxed eﬀects.
All models display Cox regressions with the left hand side representing a dummy which is one if the particular ﬁrm has left
the exchange in the year under observation and zero otherwise. We use our main proxy for the hot-issue market hypothesis:
IPO gross proceeds in general as well as the IPO gross proceeds times VC dummy interaction term. Wit regard to the
grandstanding and the certiﬁcation hypotheses we employ the age of the VC ﬁrm, the independent-VC dummy as well as
the VC-market share in accumulated IPOs as proxies.
Hot-issue market hypothesis Grandstanding/certiﬁcation hypothesis
Coeﬃcients z Coeﬃcient z
Log Sales -0.182 -9.58 -0.186 -9.73
Capex/Sales -0.030 -1.60 -0.031 -1.63
Dividend Dummy -0.194 -2.44 -0.198 -2.47
Market value -0.000 -2.42 -0.000 -2.23
Total Assets 0.000 2.82 0.000 2.71
Market-to-book -0.069 -4.53 -0.068 -4.42
FCF/Total Asset -0.127 -6.34 -0.123 -6.18
Leverage 0.118 1.53 0.117 1.51
Cash/Assets -0.810 -5.94 -0.859 -6.24
VC-backed 2.51 15.17 1.72 19.16
Age-at-IPO -0.002 -1.36 -0.002 -1.25
Kaplan-Zingales Dummy -0.069 -1.00 -0.075 -1.09
IPO gross proceeds 0.0006 94.15
IPO gross proceeds* VC dummy -0.000 -5.18
Age-VC -0.0003 -0.26
Market-share-mcap-VC 1.15 1.77
Dummy-Independent 0.18 2.91
Industry + IPO year ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes
No of observ 28277 28277
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